CentOS/RHEL packages for - Shibboleth Service Provider Security Advisory [27 February 2018]
skjacob at gmail.com
Thu Mar 8 12:16:00 EST 2018
from Scott's post:
"I investigated, discreetly, a number of SPs that my university has
campus-wide integrations with and that did not support XML Encryption "
How do you determine an SP that doesn't support XML Encryption?
On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 9:27 AM, Andy Fleming <afleming at kanren.net> wrote:
> Is anyone else having trouble getting the packages from the repos for
> leth/CentOS_7/x86_64/xmltooling-schemas-1.6.4-3.1.x86_64.rpm: [Errno 12]
> Timeout on http://provo-mirror.opensuse.org/repositories/
> 4-3.1.x86_64.rpm: (28, 'Operation too slow. Less than 1000 bytes/sec
> transferred the last 30 seconds')
> Trying other mirror.
> I've been getting these sorts of timeout errors on both EL6 and EL7
> systems since the packages were released. Yum sees that there are updates,
> but never can get them downloaded. Even cleared the yum cache. Just
> asking if there is a know problem with the repos before I start manually
> downloading and installing them.
> Andy Fleming
> Systems Engineer
> [image: KanREN] <http://www.kanren.net/>
> [image: phone] 785-856-9820 <(785)%20856-9820>
> 2029 Becker Drive, Suite 282
> Lawrence, Kansas 66047
> [image: linkedin]
> [image: twitter] <https://twitter.com/TheKanREN> [image: twitter]
> <http://www.kanren.net/feed/> need support? <support at kanren.net>
> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 9:00 AM, Cantor, Scott <cantor.2 at osu.edu> wrote:
>> I'm taking the unusual step of adding a follow up announcement on this
>> for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it's not solely a Shibboleth bug and
>> there's a blog article from the Duo researcher now that people should know
>> about. 
>> Secondly, the implications here may not be clear, so I want to reinforce
>> this: people have not found all the implementations that are vulnerable to
>> this bug and its siblings. CERT reached out to many, but they can't hit
>> everybody, and they naturally omitted a whole lot of the one-off stacks out
>> there used by cloud vendors which many in this community use Shibboleth
>> routinely to integrate.
>> As part of my nature study for this process, I investigated, discreetly,
>> a number of SPs that my university has campus-wide integrations with and
>> that did not support XML Encryption. This is the sweet spot for the bug,
>> because truncation attacks generally require overlapping user identifiers,
>> and 150,000 identities provides that kind of thing.
>> Out of about 6 I checked, 4 were vulnerable and none of them likely know
>> about this yet. I've started my own campus process of reporting the issues
>> and turning the long crank of getting the vendors aware of them.
>> Unfortunately, this is a process that many of us are going to have to spend
>> time on.
>> Some of them were vulnerable to the previous bug we fixed last month, and
>> I also am not even sure that Duo understands the full range of potential
>> flaws here because I found successful attacks that were similar to, but not
>> the same as, the one they formally reported. This is going to be a process.
>> Again, focus on the unencrypted integrations. I would also urge all of us
>> to begin to insist on the use of XML Encryption going forward. We will also
>> need to begin the long process of forcing implementations to get compliant
>> with AES-GCM encryption, which will be the default in Shibboleth V4, and
>> which replaces the long-broken AES-CBC encryption used almost universally
>> in SAML today. It's time to fix that.
>> -- Scott
>>  https://duo.com/blog/duo-finds-saml-vulnerabilities-affectin
>> To unsubscribe from this list send an email to
>> announce-unsubscribe at shibboleth.net
> For Consortium Member technical support, see https://wiki.shibboleth.net/
> To unsubscribe from this list send an email to
> users-unsubscribe at shibboleth.net
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the users