Please, somebody talk me down!
Noel Akins
nakins at sbcglobal.net
Mon Aug 1 03:30:28 BST 2011
This is your nightmares? You obviously don't have enough women in your life.
________________________________
From: Jim Fox <fox at washington.edu>
To: Shib Users <users at shibboleth.net>
Sent: Sat, July 30, 2011 11:50:39 PM
Subject: Re: Please, somebody talk me down!
David,
Go to sleep. It'll be better in the morning.
Jim
On Sat, 2011-07-30 at 10:42 -0800, David Bantz wrote:
> I have this nightmare with four scary things going on:
>
> A vendor with an application newly licensed by my institution for use by
>students, faculty and administrators says they can use our institution's central
>authentication and yes, they can use SAML to authenticate with our Shibboleth
>IdP. I'm liking this part and move on to the attributes the service needs,
>reminding them that with SAML/Shibb I can pass them current values of
>attributes upon successful authentication. "Well, no, we don't consume
>attributes; we require a batch text file with tab-delimited values of these
>attributes for all users" and they show me a list that includes name, dob, SS#,
>contact information, gender, ethnicity, as well as details of the student
>record.
>
>
> My ERP is deploying a tool to provision identity information to my IdM in real
>time; moreover the ERP's own authentication now integrates with CAS. We've spun
>up CASSHIB to bridge CAS and SAML protocols in a single SSO session, so I'm very
>excited that users of the ERP web interface will participate in our SSO
>environment. "Well, we require several extensions to CAS, provided in jar files
>specific to the JASIG implementation." So it looks like the ERP may remain a
>non-participating island "SSO."
>
> A third vendor service which has been integrated via InCommon and does consume
>attributes for entitlements turns out to have less than good practices and
>support on their end, and turns off their SP unannounced. In follow-up
>conversations they indicate there is no actual plan or target date to upgrade
>the SP, and it certainly won't be upgraded for a couple of months. "But it's
>not such a big deal, we have an alternative in-house authentication system." It
>turns out this is a credential relay: users hand over their credentials and if
>the service can successfully spoof them, they know they have valid credentials.
>Remember, they turned off the SP because they couldn't maintain or support it
>properly.
>
> For the umpteenth time, senior IT managers advise me that if we simply used "AD
>authentication" all services would automatically be integrated securely,
>reliably, with minimal maintenance or support. Neither the vendor's proprietary
>interfaces and extensions of open standards nor today's two-hour unscheduled
>outage of the entire Domain are reason for concern.
>
> You may have guessed that these aren't nightmares in my sleep. These are only
>slightly disguised and compressed versions of actual events - and they all
>happened this week.
>
> But that's still not the most scary thing to me. I know that many of the
>people on this list use the same external services in my nightmare and/or the
>same ERP and/or have executives who also think one or another favorite vended
>technology is an elixir that effortlessly provides a complete solution to IAM.
>And I don't see us as a community objecting or otherwise acting effectively to
>steer us toward more secure and sustainable practices.
>
> About two years ago InCommon seemed on the verge of stasis. Concerted efforts
>to get more members, provide additional services, advocate the federation to
>senior executives, and put it on sounder financial footing were, I think,
>effective in reviving InCommon's role. I'm concerned the four scenarios above -
>if they are at all representative of our experience generally - indicate at
>least as serious a crisis for SAML/Shibboleth and more generally for secure
>privacy-preserving authentication and authorization. And, as I say, I'm seeing
>acquiescence in those practices which threaten to derail the move to secure
>standards-based trusted third party authentication and SSO.
>
> Can somebody talk me down? Wake me from my nightmares? Start a movement?
>
> David Bantz
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