-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Shibboleth Identity Provider Security Advisory [13 May 2026] An updated version of the Identity Provider software is available which includes explicit features and updated defaults to correct a denial of service vulnerability that can cause unconstrained resource consumption using XML that exceeds typical limits on certain kinds of content. Updates to OpenSAML are included in this patch, but this advisory refers to the specific impact and mitigations for the IdP itself. A separate advisory is available for OpenSAML alone. Maliciously crafted XML causes excessive resource consumption ============================================================= While the XML parser in newer versions of Java includes default settings that limit certain kinds of malicious content, older versions did not and so can be vulnerable to specially crafted XML. These default settings are in any case not set low enough to be safe in this usage context. The OpenSAML library's decoding of SAML and SOAP messages is unprotected in its default configuration from such content and parsing some messages can result in memory and/or CPU exhaustion, causing a denial of service in applications using it, including the Shibboleth Identity Provider. Since most XML message types are parsed either without the protection of a signature or in advance of evaluating one, the exploit does not require an authenticated attacker and so is serious, though as a denial of service issue it remains in a lower tier of vulnerabilities. An updated version of the IdP (V5.2.2) is available which add new properties that limit parsing of most content that could expose the system to attack. In addition, the IdP now uses distinct parser settings when parsing SAML Metadata that are less strict than those used in general or messaging scenarios (and can be independently controlled). This allows for unusually crafted Metadata that has been observed in the wild by our community, particularly the aggregates served by the eduGAIN MDS and federations that import it without significant cleanup of the XML. Finally, the IdP has been enhanced with several new properties that can be set to control the size limits on various types of SAML and SOAP messages being decoded. Those limits are not enabled by default, but are supported in case they are needed in the future. See also the Releases Notes [1] and documentation [2] for a full rundown of the new options. Recommendations =============== Update to V5.2.2 (or later) of the Identity Provider software. The updated default settings are deemed sufficiently safe at this time. In the event that upgrading is not possible, in most older versions one may directly configure new parser attributes directly by overriding the Spring bean used to control the parsing performed in most (but not all) cases. To do so, define a bean like so in conf/global.xml: Then add a property to conf/idp.properties: idp.xml.parserPool = custom.ParserPool This is not a foolproof solution for various reasons, but it mitigates the most common attack vectors. Notably, some deployers consuming Metadata based directly on the eduGAIN MDS aggregate will find that the default attribute limit noted above is too low. We can't help that, but we do know that raising it above 50 or more is probably going to leave the IdP vulnerable to some denial of service issues that the full fix was designed to address. We can't help that. Note that we do not know the specific older versions of Java that support these parser attributes, and they are known to have gone by different names in some older versions prior to Java 17. If you are on an unsupported, older version, refer to the relevant JAXP parser documentation in that Java version for details regarding the exact names of the settings to apply. Credits ======= Jens Friess and Haya Schulmann, Goethe University Frankfurt. [1] https://shibboleth.atlassian.net/wiki/x/T4C0vg [2] https://shibboleth.atlassian.net/wiki/x/AQDJPQE URL for this Security Advisory: https://shibboleth.net/community/advisories/secadv_20260513.txt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJPBAEBCgA5FiEE3KoVAHvtneaQzZUjN4uEVAIneWIFAmoGB/MbFIAAAAAABAAO bWFudTIsMi41KzEuMTIsMCwzAAoJEDeLhFQCJ3liTu4P/i9zxvSiTTXaPDeB8WWD vo6glc/YhkUVFTzzN17eDdNHy5Kat0QEsBRRm4+zZMg8Dgs0aJbnO61ucHDnHHBK jbIIrJ22HeGYWtmVpWo7FyFJh/xC1eLFAJmYBvli/xSgZlDtRr4rLp++csgXFOLs cNYIY0uk9povvP/mF4m8/O9I3CQCxYxTlrEjfdExibJgmPPfFJUrVGybMGYvRfTV zQ4BXWFXU91NiCWZPO6fPNM7NboGaq9TIckaau9XCuV0Db637wVUezvxlAaRh3Pl BCEuvn1i+NR81hX+/lD+e10YbIrBbXugZDF8RYWc1Ne67jL1ptDtzHju7hkohsbR +Ywv98y/ATv3EndNPXIjPX7BwEyW5WbnwZ/dMGYJWVEX2fBSfj6r+0tOEzjBhNdr LNOXcpCrvoJQn7lPgRq2vjKjKTrNairajdkU7IMKUCDCT/U+7GMT1dDHphpw86C6 /CkApvOIi+fXZPrntiEQte3HJ59mlRiWtXDAbUCSyyxEI0H8Gq7bhQZPDpNG/KI8 UjqWSXjqSjsH+VViPshLB7KFz9gJvVDB8GDyTZwETJJg+QYhCWwudRXjbJNJiYOh CWdx/5fhNFw4dmEgDR3HG3rx9kx4cXeihTr+MTyTEk1ts4+1QFv/npJevgHiY/UW o4iEiwDAZuz3yIMKMY3gzni7 =cGCd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----