sign and/or encrypt SAML assetions, hack MITM

Dave Perry d.perry1 at yorksj.ac.uk
Thu Feb 22 08:26:19 UTC 2024


There is a PHP one (simpleSamlPHP) - it can also do IdP mode (no idea why you'd use that though).
Last time I tried to deploy it, to protect a PHP webapp I made, I couldn't find the latest version with the www folder it needed. So got the windows SP running with a handful of questions asked on here.

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________________________________
From: users <users-bounces at shibboleth.net> on behalf of Morgan, Andrew J via users <users at shibboleth.net>
Sent: Wednesday, February 21, 2024 8:34:55 PM
To: users at shibboleth.net <users at shibboleth.net>
Cc: Morgan, Andrew J <morgan at oregonstate.edu>
Subject: Re: sign and/or encrypt SAML assetions, hack MITM

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The vendor should use well-known SAML SP software.  Don't trust anyone to write their own SAML SP.  Unfortunately, I have no idea what SP software to recommend for them except the Shibboleth SP.

Andy
________________________________
From: users <users-bounces at shibboleth.net> on behalf of jehan.procaccia at tem-tsp.eu <jehan.procaccia at tem-tsp.eu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 21, 2024 12:07 PM
To: users at shibboleth.net <users at shibboleth.net>
Subject: Re: sign and/or encrypt SAML assetions, hack MITM

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On 21/02/2024 16:57, Peter Schober via users wrote:
> Morgan, Andrew J via users <users at shibboleth.net> [2024-02-21 16:20 CET]:
>> If you are able to modify the assertion without the SP rejecting it,
>> then that SP is not validating the signature.  Personally, I would
>> not use SAML with an SP that does not validate the signature.  As
>> you have found, anyone can modify the assertion to impersonate
>> another user - critical security bug.  Have you reported this issue
>> to the vendor's security contact?
Yes Morgan, we have reported the flow to the vendor, and are activelly
working on a correction . That's why I search for best-practice Doc  on
how to instruct them to do the right thinks, any pointer to that will be
greatly appreciated .
> Testing for this on a larger scale isn't trivial (and might include
> legal aspects) but an activity within GÉANT has recently started to
> look into this:
> https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.geant.org%2Fdisplay%2FGWP5%2FScalable%2Btesting%2Bfor%2Binsecure%2BSAML%2Bsignature%2Bvalidation&data=05%7C02%7Cmorgan%40oregonstate.edu%7C03cb1f9bcf8a4ae3eb8008dc3318b10a%7Cce6d05e13c5e4d6287a84c4a2713c113%7C0%7C0%7C638441428344213736%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=mKjesR%2By6vFQOt9Y3WxP6hyg%2B4Y8jPwRj%2BdHyWInpT4%3D&reserved=0<https://wiki.geant.org/display/GWP5/Scalable+testing+for+insecure+SAML+signature+validation>
>
Thanks again Peter for that link, it describe my problem, even more , it
focuses on properly validate the signature.

in my case it is worst, there is no signature check at all, I'll care
about the authenticity of the signature in the second step .

regards , jehan .

>
> -peter
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